Die hadden we toch al meerdere keren gehad.
Nu wel leuk om Schermer erbij te pakken.
De idee dat het boek voor gelovige wetenschappers gevaarlijk lijkt, berust op de onjuiste
veronderstelling dat wetenschappers niet ten prooi vallen aan pseudo wetenschap of mystieke ervaringen e.d. Of dat kennis daarvoor zou kunnen behoeden. Zie quotes Schermer.
Met denkers als Stephen Gould, die een apart kennisdomein voor de religie bepleitte, toont Haack weinig geduld en men kan haar moeilijk ongelijk geven. Ook met de aanhangers van het Intelligent Design maakt zij op effectieve wijze de kachel aan. Het boek lijkt mij voor gelovige wetenschappers erg gevaarlijk.
Schermer: Why smart people believe weird things
It is a given assumption in the skeptical movement — elevated to a maxim really — that intelligence and education serve as an impenetrable prophylactic against the flim flam that we assume the unintelligent and uneducated masses swallow with credulity. Indeed, at the Skeptics Society we invest considerable resources in educational materials distributed to schools and the media under the assumption that this will make a difference in our struggle against pseudoscience and superstition. These efforts do make a difference, particularly for those who are aware of the phenomena we study but have not heard a scientific explanation for them, but are the cognitive elite protected against the nonsense that passes for sense in our culture? Is flapdoodle the fodder for only fools? The answer is no. The question is why?
Smart people, because they are more intelligent and better educated, are better able to give intellectual reasons justifying their beliefs that they arrived at for non-intellectual reasons. Yet smart people, like everyone else, recognize that emotional needs and being raised to believe something are how most of us most of the time come to our beliefs. The intellectual attribution bias then kicks in, especially in smart people, to justify those beliefs, no matter how weird they may be.
In this sense, Mack’s abduction belief system operates much like religion and other faith-based beliefs, in that for those who believe proof is not necessary, for those who do not believe, proof is not possible. In other words, the belief in UFOs and alien abductions, like that of other weird beliefs, is orthogonal to and independent of the evidence for or against it, or the intelligence of its proponents, which makes my point. Q.E.D.
Het ziet er naar uit dat specifieke eigenschappen die je een wetenschapper maken ook of juist ontvankelijk kunnen maken voor zoiets als religie of weird things. Susan Blackmore is een prachtig voorbeeld.
Ik vond het zelluf ook zo gezellig herkenbaar. Wat dat betreft heb ik goddank een juridisch ondergrondje... bron, bron, bron, bewijs, bewijs, bewijs.
Today’s most popular trait theory is what is known as the Five Factor model, or the “Big Five”:
Conscientiousness (competence, order, dutifulness),
Agreeableness (trust, altruism, modesty),
Openness to Experience (fantasy, feelings, values),
Extroversion (gregariousness, assertiveness, excitement seeking), and
Neuroticism (anxiety, anger, depression).
In the study on religiosity and belief in God conducted by Frank Sulloway and I, we found openness to experience to be the most significant predictor, with higher levels of openness related to lower levels of religiosity and belief in God. In studies of individual scientist’s *personalities and their receptivity to fringe ideas like the paranormal, I found that a healthy balance between high conscientiousness and high openness to experience led to a moderate amount of skepticism. This was most clearly expressed in the careers of paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould and astronomer Carl Sagan. They were nearly off the scale in both conscientiousness and openness to experience, giving them that balance between being open-minded enough to accept the occasional extraordinary claim that turns out to be right, but not so open that one blindly accepts every crazy claim that anyone makes.
Persons who tend to score high on mysticism scales tend also to score high on such variables as complexity, openness to new experience, breadth of interests, innovation, tolerance of ambiguity, and creative personality. Furthermore, they are likely to score high on measures of hypnotizability, absorption, and fantasy proneness, suggesting a capacity to suspend the judging process that distinguishes imaginings and real events and to commit their mental resources to representing the imaginal object as vividly as possible. Individuals high on hypnotic susceptibility are also more likely to report having undergone religious conversion, which for them is primarily an experiential rather than a cognitive phenomenon — that is, one marked by notable alterations in perceptual, affective, and ideomotor response patterns.