Re: Convergentie in de evolutie
Geplaatst: 12 aug 2014 15:43
Ik heb wel een artikel gevonden op het blog van Jerry A. Coyne, waarin de gedachte die bij Dat beloof ik meteen opkwam uitgebreid besproken wordt:
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com ... evolution/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Some people have doubted that Conway Morris’s work on convergence was either conditioned by or heavily influenced his views on God. For these doubters, I urge them to check out an article I read yesterday, “Creation and evolutionary convergence” (pp. 258–269 in The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity, J. B. Stump and A. G. Padgett, eds. 2012, Blackwell Publishing). I am publishing two excerpts from the book (leaving out the section on “Predictable evolution?” since I’ve already discussed that idea), to show how Conway Morris’s belief has slanted his science. It is an example of religionism (the opposite of scientism): my neologism for the tendency of religion to overstep its boundaries and claim that science gives evidence for God or the supernatural.
From the section “The Emergence of Cognition,” here’s Conway Morris claiming that the emergence of mind from matter testifies to the transcendent (i.e., Jesus):
There seems to be no a priori reason why mind should emerge from matter. The solution (if that is the word) is to postulate that mind is identifiably different. This need not lead to dualism. Consider this alternative, that whilst mind is certainly embodied in one sense, we serve as receptacles, or perhaps better an “antenna” for mind. From this perspective, we should be neither surprised that we have access to truths that are themselves immaterial, nor immediately dismiss “out-of-body” experiences.”
But it is the theological implications that are even more intriguing. Talk of mind as a real property invites consideration of a whole spectrum of issues, such as the nature of free will (the emergence of which from a materiality which is oblivious to intentionality seems to be incoherent), the sense of purpose, and the likelihood that whilst our minds are necessarily embodied (although near-death experiences suggest this is not essential), in other agencies mind could still be very much part of the universe but from our mundane perspective immaterial. (p. 265-266)
And, from the section “And Christianity?,” Conway Morris justifies miracles (p. 266):
What then of Chistianity?. . . The idea of a god may be bad enough, but to have him wandering around in an out-of-the-way nook of the Roman empire, with a raggle-taggle band of followers, then fizzling out in an all too common method of execution, and to cap it all to claim he was God incarnate seems risible. They might, however, benefit from a refresher course in theology rather than sitting at the feet of the village atheist.
What we seem to see is an interpenetration of worlds with the unavoidable conclusion that much lies beyond our mundane expectations. Such is evident from the Transfiguration, Resurrection, and Ascension. Science in its present primitive state has very little useful to say about any of these events: just because they are inexplicable does not mean that they did not happen.
It is sad that such an accomplished scientist has gone this route: I wonder if his religiosity preceded or followed his scientific studies. What’s even sadder—and annoying as well—is that Conway Morris goes around purveying this kind of “evidence” for God in public venues, such as the Gifford Lectures and talks at the infamous Faraday Institute at Cambridge University. (Cambridge is fast becoming a hotbed of mush-brained accommodationism).
Inevitably, Dr. Conway Morris’s work on evolutionary convergence was supported by The Templeton Foundation ($983,253 from 2006-2009), and his work on the emergence of biological complexity, along with that of five other principal investigators, was also sponsored by Templeton ($3,584,147 between 2005-2008). For my previous posts on Conway Morris, including his evolutionary views and connection to Templeton, go here, here, and here. I predict that within a decade Conway Morris will nab the Templeton Prize.
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com ... evolution/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Some people have doubted that Conway Morris’s work on convergence was either conditioned by or heavily influenced his views on God. For these doubters, I urge them to check out an article I read yesterday, “Creation and evolutionary convergence” (pp. 258–269 in The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity, J. B. Stump and A. G. Padgett, eds. 2012, Blackwell Publishing). I am publishing two excerpts from the book (leaving out the section on “Predictable evolution?” since I’ve already discussed that idea), to show how Conway Morris’s belief has slanted his science. It is an example of religionism (the opposite of scientism): my neologism for the tendency of religion to overstep its boundaries and claim that science gives evidence for God or the supernatural.
From the section “The Emergence of Cognition,” here’s Conway Morris claiming that the emergence of mind from matter testifies to the transcendent (i.e., Jesus):
There seems to be no a priori reason why mind should emerge from matter. The solution (if that is the word) is to postulate that mind is identifiably different. This need not lead to dualism. Consider this alternative, that whilst mind is certainly embodied in one sense, we serve as receptacles, or perhaps better an “antenna” for mind. From this perspective, we should be neither surprised that we have access to truths that are themselves immaterial, nor immediately dismiss “out-of-body” experiences.”
But it is the theological implications that are even more intriguing. Talk of mind as a real property invites consideration of a whole spectrum of issues, such as the nature of free will (the emergence of which from a materiality which is oblivious to intentionality seems to be incoherent), the sense of purpose, and the likelihood that whilst our minds are necessarily embodied (although near-death experiences suggest this is not essential), in other agencies mind could still be very much part of the universe but from our mundane perspective immaterial. (p. 265-266)
And, from the section “And Christianity?,” Conway Morris justifies miracles (p. 266):
What then of Chistianity?. . . The idea of a god may be bad enough, but to have him wandering around in an out-of-the-way nook of the Roman empire, with a raggle-taggle band of followers, then fizzling out in an all too common method of execution, and to cap it all to claim he was God incarnate seems risible. They might, however, benefit from a refresher course in theology rather than sitting at the feet of the village atheist.
What we seem to see is an interpenetration of worlds with the unavoidable conclusion that much lies beyond our mundane expectations. Such is evident from the Transfiguration, Resurrection, and Ascension. Science in its present primitive state has very little useful to say about any of these events: just because they are inexplicable does not mean that they did not happen.
It is sad that such an accomplished scientist has gone this route: I wonder if his religiosity preceded or followed his scientific studies. What’s even sadder—and annoying as well—is that Conway Morris goes around purveying this kind of “evidence” for God in public venues, such as the Gifford Lectures and talks at the infamous Faraday Institute at Cambridge University. (Cambridge is fast becoming a hotbed of mush-brained accommodationism).
Inevitably, Dr. Conway Morris’s work on evolutionary convergence was supported by The Templeton Foundation ($983,253 from 2006-2009), and his work on the emergence of biological complexity, along with that of five other principal investigators, was also sponsored by Templeton ($3,584,147 between 2005-2008). For my previous posts on Conway Morris, including his evolutionary views and connection to Templeton, go here, here, and here. I predict that within a decade Conway Morris will nab the Templeton Prize.